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The acquisition of scientific evidence between Frye and 
Daubert. From ad hominem arguments to cross-examination 
among experts   
 
LORENZO ZOPPELLARI 
Faculty of Law 
University of Trento 





The Frye and Daubert rulings give us two very different ways to intend the relation between law and 
science. Through the contributions of Wellman and Walton, we will see how the main method to question 
the expert’s testimony before a judge deferent to science is to question her personal integrity by using ad 
hominem arguments. Otherwise, using Alvin Goldman’s novice/expert problem, we will investigate if other 
manners of argumentative cross-examinations are possible.  
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With this paper, we aim to add a small piece to the wider and much discussed topic of 
the relationship between science and law. We will pursue this target with a specific regard 
to the argumentative profiles that it poses. Thus, our chosen perspective to explore this 
vast field of studies is, on the one hand, related to the evolution of the relationship 
between science and trial, and on the other hand, related to the argumentative techniques 
for acquiring scientific evidence during this evolution.  
As far as the first aspect is concerned – taking into account the limited space and 
knowledge – we obviously will not be able to deal with the entire history, which had 
science and law as protagonists. Therefore, in the first paragraph we will focus 
exclusively on the two main stages, which helped to highlight the relationship between 
science and law in a trial during the twentieth century1. We will examine two famous 
leading cases – the Frye ruling in 1923 and the Daubert ruling in 1993 – which from their 
original American context have had effects on the Italian system as well2. The Frye ruling, 
 
1 We will mostly refer to the penal trial context. In fact, in civil literature, especially in the Italian 
context, the scientific evidence topic had so far received sporadic attention and the non-frequent 
jurisprudence, has been limited to generic and rather questionable statements (Taruffo, p. 219; Puppo 2004, 
p. 355). 
2 As an example, throughout this contribution the 2010 Cozzini ruling of the Italian Corte di Cassazione 
will be referred to as a clone of the American Daubert ruling in 1993, according to many interpreters. In 
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will give us the image of a judge subordinated to science, while the Daubert ruling will 
give us the image of a judge ‘in dialogue’ with the scientific theories proposed by experts. 
In fact, the judge is called to express her opinion on the validity of the scientific theories 
within the juridical context of the particular decision, redeeming the epistemological tools 
of the trial and underlining the crisis of the universal idea of science, which was typical 
during the modernity. 
In the second paragraph, stemming from examples offered by Francis L. Wellman in 
The art of cross-examination and using Douglas Walton’s reconstructions of legal 
argumentation, we will see how the use of ad hominem arguments is the main tool that 
juridical actors have to cross-examine experts, as long as the trial is subordinated to 
science. Lastly, keeping in mind the new role entrusted to the judge by the ‘Daubert turn’, 
in the third paragraph we will use the strategies suggested by Alvin Goldman in his 
novice/expert problem to understand what the new perspectives of a trial are where an 
effective dialogue with experts’ theories is present. 
 
 
2. The expert testimony and the different evaluation standards of scientific proof  
 
 
In assessing the way which science and law intertwine inside courtrooms, it is possible 
to identify essentially two main trends that affect, in some aspects, the different legal 
systems. First of all one can talk about a general perspective – which we will not deal 
with directly – which is the policies one (in the mutual influence of social needs and 
sciences) and, secondly, one can talk about a particular perspective, which is going to be 
the main topic of this paper, concerning the way in which scientific outcomes interfere 
with judicial decisions. 
In order to understand how this latter relationship between science and law takes place, 
it is necessary to examine the figure of the expert testimony, which is the main means of 
proof by which science has access to a trial. In fact, thanks to a growing complexity of 
society, the number of experts requested by parties and judges is countless, as well as 
their disciplines of provenance (Haack, p. 114). For our purposes, it is important to focus 
on the main and well-known difference between lay testimony and expert testimony3. 
While the former can report only on what is directly known, generally because she 
assisted personally to it4, expert testimony is allowed to reach her personal conclusions 
 
order to understand better the ongoing Italian debate on the substantial and procedural concept of scientific 
evidence, it is important to refer to the American experience, where confrontation on the scientific nature 
of evidence has been going on for years (Bertolino, p. 3). 
3 We decided to use the American wording; but it is not correct when referring to the Italian context. In 
fact in Italy during a penal trial, the distinction is between testimonies on one side (the subjects who have 
been called to refer on facts known not by virtue of her specific competences, art. 194 of the Italian 
procedural penal code [c.p.p.]), and periti or technical consultants, on the other. The perito is directly 
appointed by the judge, in accordance with art. 220 c.p.p.; while technical consultants, are experts appointed 
by the prosecutor or by the other parties, in accordance with artt. 225 and 230 c.p.p.. 
4 In the American context, the Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 602, in terms of lay testimonies, reports: 
«A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the 
witness has personal knowledge of the matter». However, in the Italian context, art. 194 c.p.p., states: «The 
testimony is examined on facts which are object of proof», where ‘object of proof’ indicates «a life episode 
or judicial fact that must be proven whether it happened or not» [definition given by Codice di procedura 
penale esplicato, 2015, Napoli, Ed. Giur. Simone, our translation]. 
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stemming from data, which is submitted to her during the trial5. The expert, indeed, can 
reach conclusions that are not strictly linked to her personal perception but, differently, 
that can be based on her technical skills (Haack, p. 211)6. In other words, the expert 
witness can identify scientific-technical laws valid for inferring one fact from another and 
can make this inference available to the reasoning of the parties and the judge; she can 
reach this inference on the basis of factual data which have already been introduced 
during the trial by other means of proof; she can carry out the same inference from factual 
data not constituting already an evidence, but only postulated (the so called, hypothetical 
question) (Dominioni, p. 40)7. 
This possibility of exposing her inferences on the facts to the court, which both Italian 
and American judicial systems grant to those who give their depositions as experts, will 
be the center of the investigation that will take place in the third paragraph of this paper. 
In fact, according to us, this peculiarity can have precise repercussions on the modality in 
which the examination, and specifically, the cross-examination of the expert takes place. 
After all, these are moments when in a rhetorical-dialectical way – that is, through 
questions of prosecutors and lawyers, and the expert witnesses’ answers – the persuasive 
effectiveness of science is explained towards judges, and thus towards the law (Manzin, 
p. 258). 
Before reaching such considerations, it is important to focus on the background where 
the expert’s testimony takes place. In other words, in order to reason on the importance 
of scientific evidence during the process and its acquisition methods, it is primarily 
important to understand the relationship between science and law. 
As already mentioned in the introduction, this complex relationship has a long history 
and we certainly cannot fully analyze it. We intend to use the last century as a reference 
and isolate the two main stages that have defined two different ways of interpreting such 
relationship. We refer to two extremely renowned leading cases, even though both 
coming from an American context, they are able to reflect perfectly the evolution of the 
balances in question8.  
While the first paradigmatic ruling, the so-called Frye, gives an image of a judge 
subordinated to the results of science, which is intended statically (Dominioni, p. 193), 
the second ruling, the so-called Daubert, gives an image of a judge who is ‘in dialogue’ 
 
5 In the American context, FRE 701 claims that a lay testimony, as opposed to an expert one, is 
authorized to bring her opinions or inference only in two cases. Firstly, when the opinion or inference is 
«rationally based on the perception of the witness» and secondly, when the opinion or inference is «helpful 
to a clear understanding of the witness’ testimony or the determination of a fact in issue». 
6 In the Italian context, the rule which extends the expert’s faculty during her testimony is art. 220 c.p.p., 
in the section that authorizes her to «investigate, acquire data or make evaluations that require specific 
technical, scientific or artistic competences». Instead, in the American context, it is especially FRE 702 
(combined with 703) which sanctions a difference between the lay testimony and the expert one: «A witness 
who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form 
of an opinion […]». 
7 Wellman, in the text that we will analyze in the next paragraph (The art of cross-examination), 
expresses some considerations – very skeptical – on the approach of hypothetical questions and answers 
(Wellman, p. 164). 
8 As we will see, we refer to the famous ruling of Frye in 1923 and Daubert in 1993. As regards to the 
Frye standard, one cannot talk about a real effect of this ruling outside American borders, but that this 
decision represented the sentiment of deference that the entire Western juridical world, not only American, 
felt towards science during the first half of the twentieth century. While, regarding the effect that the 
Daubert ruling had in Italy, many commentators consider the Cozzini ruling, declared by the Corte di 
cassazione in 2010, a sort of clone of the Daubert one (Carlizzi, p. 99). 
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with the different scientific theories proposed. Indeed, the judge actively must choose the 
one that better suits the concrete decision, rather than others according to a dynamic 
perspective. In order words, with the necessary epistemological authority, the judge is 
allowed to asses independently the range of the scientific theories that access the trial. 
Proceeding in order, the two decisions are analyzed more in detail below. 
In 1923, during the famous ruling Frye v. United States, the Circuit Court of District 
of Columbia was faced with the question of whether or not admitting a truth machine in 
the trial. Thus, the famous criterion called general acceptance test (or, Frye standard) 
was elaborated. 
According to this criterion – which met its great fortune in courts because used for 
many decades with undisputed adhesion (Carlizzi, p. 118) – in order to establish the 
reliability of a scientific theory in a trial, the judge must refer to the opinion generally 
accepted by the scientific community of reference (Carlizzi, p. 84). For our purposes, it 
is sufficient to underline two important repercussions, closely related to each other, 
connected to the explicit reference that the theory suggested by the expert has to be 
previously accepted by the scientific community. First, this implies that many 
‘intermediate’ theories between exact science and pseudoscience (or so-called junk 
science), despite being effective in explaining the connection between elements of the 
trial, are unable to access the trial (Carlizzi, p. 85). Secondly, this implies that the judge 
must have a ‘deferent’ attitude towards official science. In fact, wherever there is a theory 
that has already been discussed and recognized by the scientific community, the judge 
can only recognize its access in court and, on the contrary, in case of no recognition by 
the official science, she will have to deny the possibility of the theory being effective in 
accounting for the case facts. This deference – as we will return to say – on the one hand, 
implies that a neutral scientific community (with claims of universality) actually exists; 
on the other hand, that the juridical context is expressly subordinated to this scientific 
community and therefore, without epistemological tools to question its results 
(Tallacchini, p. VII).  
It is by this alleged subordination of the law to science that, during the second half of 
the last century, it was being recorded as the general acceptance criterion [the Frye 
standard] was precluding actual analysis of reliability and validity of the inferred 
evidence, delegating judicial decisions to scientists (Dominioni, p. 119).  
As well as this “intolerance” of the courts, the idea of a neutral, concordant and 
objective science that, far from judgment, was able to offer universally valid theories 
became more and more scarce. In other words, from the last-century Sixties, the 
awareness of the fact that there are no rules to determine when a scientific topic is 
guaranteed enough from evidence in order to be accepted or sufficiently weakened by the 
evidence to be rejected, started to grow (Haack, p. 221). 
It is clear that, in the face of this epistemic change, the concept of a very deferential 
judge towards the scientific community could no longer be considered satisfying, at the 
cost of leaving judicial decisions at the mercy of the impossibility of scientific knowledge 
to provide incontrovertible certainties (Dominioni, p. 125).  
Also by virtue of such motivations, in 1993, another leading case was decided. It 
marked a division between the previous image of a “deferent judge” and what will be 
discussed in the third paragraph, the so-called gatekeeper judge who is able to evaluate 
scientific theories. We are referring to the Daubert v. Merrel-Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc. 
case, where the Supreme Federal Court took the opportunity to mark a drastic turning 
point in the admittance of evidence. Putting aside the factual details of the decision, the 
 5 
main landfall was that the judge, exercising a so-called function of gatekeeper, evaluated 
the scientific evidence not by referring anymore to the ipse dixit of the scientific 
community. However, taking into account the reconstructions that emerged during the 
trial, the judge exercised a direct control over the reliability of the technical proposed 
theory in a non-absolute way (Puppo 2004, p. 358). This conferral of greater 
responsibilities to the judge in analyzing the merit of scientific theory, led to two further 
consequences which for our purposes, we have defined subjective (of the judge) and 
objective (of the trial). A direct consequence connected to the subjective component is 
that the judge having to exercise her direct control, must also have the necessary 
knowledge. Thus, it opened the doors to an always greater frequency, in the American 
juridical literature (and not only), of studies which illustrate the problems of the scientific 
method and its possible relevance for the judicial evaluation of evidence (Dominioni, p. 
145). Connected to the one that we defined the objective consequence, in order for the 
judge to fulfill his role as an evaluator of the scientific results during the trial, she must 
be able to count on wise procedural devices that guarantee the correct assumption of the 
expert testimony. We will return to these two elements – the subjective and the objective 
ones – in the third paragraph.  
 
 




To continue our analysis of the role of scientific evidence in a trial, in this paragraph 
we will examine two well-known texts. 
The first one is The Art of cross-examination where the famous American prosecutor 
(and later lawyer), Francis L. Wellman, gave some useful advice to colleagues who at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, had to cross-examine the testimonies. Then, we will 
examine Douglas Walton’s Legal argumentation and evidence, and we will compare the 
reconstruction that he makes of argumentative techniques during the acquisition of 
testimonies with the examples offered by Wellman. 
Let us proceed with order. In the first pages of the chapter on cross-examination of the 
expert testimony, Wellman clarifies immediately what he will reiterate several times 
through examples: as a general rule, it is not prudent for the cross-examiner to try to keep 
up with the specialist regarding topics concerning its specific subject. Long cross-
examinations concerning the expert’s theory, exposed during the direct examination, 
usually result in disaster. They constitute a hazard, which must rarely be used (Wellman, 
p. 130). Therefore, what emerges is the idea that a trial is not the right place to test the 
goodness of a scientific theory given by the expert and if it has passed the critical 
examination of the scientific community, it enters the trail with unassailable strength. In 
fact, after a few lines, Wellman reveals the risks that a lawyer incurs disregarding the 
above-mentioned advice, during the cross-examination of a doctor. By doing so,  
 
she ends up offering the opportunity to further spread on the deposition which 
he has already given to the doctor, thus allowing him to clarify to the jury 
what, instead, it may not have been understood or completely ignored 
(Wellman, p. 131, our translation).  
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Therefore, the main strategy given by Wellman to cross-examine an expert testimony 
would consist in attacking his personal credibility, leaving aside completely the technical 
content of the testimony. The author provides many examples about this. Only some are 
reported below: 
 
- The entire effect of an expert’s deposition can sometimes be nullified by 
submitting the testimony to a sudden and unexpected verification of his 
experience, ability and judgment. If the expert fails the test, he may be 
ridiculed in front of the jury. In this way, the laughter aroused will make 
the jurors forget everything that he has declared against the reasons 
supported by the cross-examiner (Wellman, p. 138, our translation, our 
cursive); 
 
- QUESTION: “Doctor, you declare currently practicing as such. Have you 
been doing it for long in the city of Chicago?” ANSWER: “Yes, I have 
been practicing here in Chicago for almost forty years now” Q: “Well 
doctor, during this time, I assume you have had the chance to treat some 
of our most eminent citizens. Am I right?” A: “Yes, I think so” Q: “Any 
chance, doctor, that you have ever been called as a family doctor, to visit 
old Mr. Marshall Field?” A: “Yes, I was his doctor for several years” Q: 
“By the way, I haven’t heard of him recently. Where is he now?” A: “He 
is dead” Q: “Oh, I’m sorry to hear that. Were you ever old Mr. Cormick’s 
doctor?” A: “Yes, for many years” Q: “Could I ask where he is now?” A: 
“He is dead” Q: “Oh, I am sorry”. He continued in the same way, to ask 
information about eight or ten of the most important citizens of Chicago 
who he knew had been his friend’s [the testimony] patients and who were 
all deceased. Once the list was over, he calmly sat down while the jury 
giggled and commented: “I do not think it is necessary to ask further 
questions. Have a seat” (Wellman, pp. 157-58, our translation)9.  
 
Therefore, in Wellman’s text, one can notice a general attitude towards the expert 
testimonies, which, twenty years later, will find its expression in the Frye standard. There 
is the conception that scientific knowledge, which has developed and tested outside 
courthouses, technically cannot be questioned during the trial because – according to its 
epistemological inferiority – it is only the place to test personal reliability of testimonies 
(Wellman, p. 130)10. To the point that the objective repeatedly stated by Wellman is to 
arouse laughter in the listeners. 
As already mentioned in the beginning, when we talk about scientific evidence within 
the trial, one usually refers to the testimony of an expert (Walton 2002, pp. 236-37). In 
fact, even though scientific evidence can initially be under the form of documentation or 
judicial experiment, interpretative activity of an expert who can explain the results of 
specific means of proof and links them in a significant way to the case in question during 
the judicial dialectic is often necessary (which always happens in a rhetorical and 
 
9 Even in this case, one must highlight how the examination does not relate at all to the circumstances 
of the testimony deposed, but only discredit the expert witness. 
10 It is interesting to underline how the idea – typically modern and which will suffer a crisis only during 
the second half of the twentieth century – of the existence of an actual objective and neutral science which 
law cannot criticize, emerges throughout Wellman’s text. 
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dialectical manner). As pointed out by Douglas Walton, the ability of scientific evidence 
to explain the facts of the cause is largely connected to the reliability of the expert 
testimony who offers interpretation, which emerges during long examinations and cross-
examinations (Walton 2002, p. 237). Therefore, since the entire scientific debate cannot 
be reproduced within the trial, the Author defines the arguments used by prosecutors, 
lawyers and judges, which follow the expert’s reports, as appeal to expert opinion. 
What tools do trial parties – as said, lawyers, prosecutors and judges (or jurors) – have 
in order to examine different opinions of conflicting experts?  
Undoubtedly, in the first half of the twentieth century – the period of Wellman and the 
Frye standard – the distrust of epistemological tools of the trial leads to believe that only 
the expert’s personal reliability can be examined and not the technicality of the theory 
which she brings to court. 
In his reconstruction of the typical characteristics of legal argumentation, Douglas 
Walton provides us with proof on how this type of attitude towards experts, is still 
extremely actual. In fact, according to the Author, cross-examination of the expert 
testimony consists in: i) an exetastic dialogue between the expert and his counter-
examiner (e.g. the defense lawyer if expert is in the prosecution), ii) during which 
questions which criticize conclusions of the counterparty that base their acceptability on 
the appeal to expert opinion (e.g. on what is claimed by the expert who is being cross-
examined) are reasonable (therefore, legitimate) (Walton 2002, p. 241). We can see these 
two points briefly.  
From the interpretation in a later work that Walton himself provides of the so-called 
exetastic dialogues, these are distinguished by the fact that who asks the questions tries 
to lead the other party to a sort of personal inconsistency, which is then used to attack the 
technical-scientific arguments. In fact, the exetastic type of argument corresponds quite 
well to the descriptions of the circumstantial ad hominem argument given in modern logic 
textbooks (Walton 2007, p. 64).  
However, while ad hominem arguments are generally considered invalid because 
misleading from the focus of the dialogue (D’Agostini, pp. 109-10), in his theory of 
argumentation, Walton reaffirms the legitimacy of it in the context of the trial, especially 
if moved forward against the expert testimony during the cross-examination. In fact – as 
one can remember – scientific evidence which is often useful to define the fact, does not 
have legal value itself,  but only after having found a place – generally through the 
expert’s testimony – within the rhetorical-dialectical activity of the parties in court (Puppo 
2015, p. 219). In this context, dominated by subjects without actual ‘scientific’ 
qualifications (the public prosecutor, the lawyer, the judge, the jurors), the most 
accessible method to compare the contrasting experts’ thesis, is to in fact discuss their 
reliability or personal credibility, in terms which are understandable also outside the 
specific scientific sphere, rather than reasoning on technical details of their thesis (Walton 
2002, p. 243).  
Therefore, the ways to carry out cross-examination of the expert testimony – thus, 
acquiring scientific evidence – suggested by Wellman, as well as being confirmed in 
Walton’s legal argumentation, appear to be the only possible ones as long as there is a 
model of ‘deferent’ trial towards science, represented by the Frye standard. In fact, by 
limiting the epistemological possibilities of judgment, the use of ad hominem arguments 




4. Perspectives of expert testimony after the ‘Daubert turn’ 
 
 
As we saw, with contributing factors such as epistemological crisis of science and the 
authority claim of the courts, in 1993, with the Daubert case, there was a change of 
perspective. In that context, the Court introduced the principle according to which general 
acceptance of the scientific community as well as peer review, are only a part of the 
elements that judges have to determine what is, in a specific case, valid science 
(Tallacchini, p. XVI). 
This new role conferred to courts, entails greater responsibilities in particular when 
taking on scientific evidence, during which judges (or the jury) must evaluate technical 
merit of the proposed theory and therefore, long cross-examinations that focus on expert’s 
credibility, could no longer be sufficient. 
As one might remember, at the end of the first paragraph we referred to two orders of 
consequences strictly linked to the ‘Daubert turn’, a subjective one (of the judge) and an 
objective one (of the trial).  
In relation to the subjective element, we have already referred to the increasing 
literature that aims to educate legal operators on peculiarities of the scientific method11. 
However, it is evident that given the variety and complexity of the issues that reach the 
courts, it is unthinkable that prosecutors, lawyers, judges and jurors become connoisseurs 
of every discipline in order to confront the experts and evaluate their theories. Hence, the 
relationship between the expert and the juridical actors resembles the existing one 
between the expert and the novice who is studying the former’s words, within the 
scientific field. This type of comparison reminds us the Alvin Goldman’s novice/expert 
problem, where the Author wonders what the real possibilities for a novice to identify the 
best theory among a dispute between experts, are. According to Goldman, if a non-expert 
finds herself in such a situation – extremely common in trial, suffice to think of the experts 
of respective parties who offer opposite interpretations on the same phenomena – she 
would have five different possible strategies to establish the actual competence of the 
interlocutors and the best available theory (Goldman, p. 93; see also Zuolo, pp. 21-23):  
I) Discuss the actual goodness of the arguments presented by the experts to support 
their position; 
II) Compare the experts to each other; 
III) Consult a meta-expert; 
IV) Check for any conflicts of interest or prejudice of the experts; 
V) Verify previous successes obtained by experts in applying their theories.  
As already mentioned, we are aware that the scientific and legal spheres of research 
are completely different and that for the latter, the discovery of the best scientific thesis 
among the proposed ones is only one of the useful aims in decision making, but not the 
most important one (Haack, p. 226). However, taking into account the role of assessing 
science given to the judges by the Daubert decision, let us try to consider briefly, whether 
and in what ways these five strategies can be used within Italian and American penal 
trials, in order to evaluate their epistemological tools before science. 
Out of the five proposed steps to evaluate scientific theories that enter a trial, probably 
the last two correspond to what has already been analyzed in the previous paragraphs; the 
 
11 For example, Jasanoff (2005) or Haack (2015). The latter, especially, allows for further consideration 
on the investigation regarding which is the scientific method confirmed by the Daubert ruling (Haack, pp. 
157-206). 
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second and the third one are strictly connected to decisions of procedural policy made by 
each judicial system; while the former, corresponds to a further epistemological effort 
that the ‘Daubert turn’ requires from the courts. 
As far as point IV) is concerned – the presence of conflicts of interests or prejudice of 
the expert’s testimony – we believe that this step is potentially satisfied by exetastic 
dialogue seen in the previous paragraph. In fact, the ad hominem arguments used by cross-
examiners are aimed to attack personal characteristics of the expert, such as alleged 
partisanship or lack of clarity of her skills. 
Point V) – the evaluation of previous successes obtained by the expert’s theory within 
the scientific community – instead appears to retrace what was expected by the Frye 
standard regarding admission of scientific evidence in court. This criterion did not 
disappear after the Daubert ruling, but simply constitutes one of the elements of scientific 
evidence assessment and not the decisive one (Dominioni, p. 147)12. 
As mentioned, the actualization of points II) and III) is linked to the assumption of 
certain penal procedural policies by the various legal systems – especially the 
implementation of pure or spurious accusatory system or, otherwise, investigatory 
systems – which do not represent the main object of this paper13. Just to give some 
examples, in the early 2000s the Italian Corte di Cassazione14 expressed itself regarding 
the opportunity for experts to compare among themselves (point number two). This 
decision n. 35187 of 2002, restated that in accordance to art. 501 of the Italian procedural 
penal code (hereinafter “c.p.p”), a comparison among experts is possible only according 
to art. 212 c.p.p. during the trial, but in no way can expert witnesses cross-examine each 
other15. In this context, we cannot analyze in depth the details of the art. 212 c.p.p., but 
for our purposes it is sufficient to underline that through this method of comparison 
experts cannot ask each other direct questions (authority which is solely reserved to the 
judge, at this stage) but at most, express concerns about the colleague’s thesis. However, 
as far as point III) is concerned – the possibility of consulting a meta-expert – the 
difference between the American and Italian procedural system strongly emerges. While 
in the first, because it is purely accusatory, there is no possibility for the judge to interfere 
with his own expert in the dispute between parties (Tonini, p. 2); in the second, the figure 
of the meta-expert can be represented by a consultant appointed by the judge ex artt. 220 
c.p.p. and ff. (the so called perito)16. 
Now, let us see the first strategy that Goldman suggests to a novice who would like to 
understand which expert to trust. As we have already said, briefly, it seems an expression 
of what was required in the Daubert ruling, namely that judges evaluate the actual extent 
 
12 As far as the Italian legal system is concerned, remembering what has been said previously, the 
Cozzini ruling is considered a clone of the Daubert one by many interpreters, see notes n. 2 and 8. 
13 For further information on epistemological competence of the accusatory trial, see Haack, pp. 39-67. 
14 It represents the third and last degree of judgment in Italy. 
15 «Technical consultants are not given the right to cross-examine the experts, since art. 501, comma 1, 
of the c.p.p., on the subject of experts and technical consultants’ examination, refers to the norms of the 
testimonies’ examination if applicable. These norms on the testimonies’ examination do not consider any 
cross-examination of testimonies between each other (and the consultant is compared to the testimony), but 
only the possibility to be confronted and questioned by the prosecutor, as well as the defender of the parties» 
[Cass. pen., sez. I, sent. n. 35187 of October 21, 2002, our translation]. 
16 The perito is not appointed by the judge with the direct purpose of offering her opinion on the dispute 
between the consultants of the parties, but with the aim of facilitating the judge in carrying out 
investigations or evaluations that require specific technical skills. In light of the proposed reconstruction, it 
is clear that its report can serve as a meta-report with reference to the thesis of the consultants of the parties 
(Dominioni, pp. 340-44). 
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of the experts’ arguments. It is interesting to report some of the Author’s reflections 
because they allow us to understand how the transfer of information from expert to 
novice, occurs. This, for our purpose, contributes to the composition of the famous 
paradox, which distinguishes experts’ testimony: «science which confesses its 
uncertainty urges a judge’s intervention; but the judge is not able to make an informed 
decision if he cannot understand what science has to offer him» (Tuzet, p. 206)17. In the 
following analysis, we will see a comeback of what we defined, in the first paragraph, as 
objective consequences of the ‘Daubert turn’: the need of procedural devices suitable for 
the new epistemological role recognized to the judges.  
As you will remember, the main characteristic that distinguishes the expert testimony 
from a lay one is that the first one is authorized to formulate inferences based on her 
specialized experience stemming from facts that emerged during the trial. Goldman, 
evoking a contribution of John Hardwig, in identifying the main differences between a 
novice and an expert, refers precisely to the different ability of the two subjects to draw 
conclusions within a specific context (Hardwig, pp. 336-39). In fact the novice: 
a) Does not possess any or some of the premises from which the expert draws her 
conclusions; 
b) Is in a condition of epistemological inferiority which does not allow her to evaluate 
the relationship that the expert has placed between the premises and the conclusion; 
c) Does not know any or some of the possible conditions that would make defeasible the 
transitions from premises to conclusion of the expert.   
In reference to point a), the Author devotes his attention in distinguishing, among the 
statements pronounced by the expert, between the so-called esoteric ones and the so-
called exoteric ones (Goldman, p. 94). While for the latter, the novice is able to establish 
their truth-value because they are not related to the expert’s specific area of expertise, the 
former – due to their high technical component – are more difficult to understand, to the 
point that the novice is not able to establish their truth-value. Goldman, then, makes a 
further distinction among esoteric statements, dividing them into ones that owe their 
complexity to semantic reasons – therefore, their complexity can be easily overcome by 
paraphrases or reformulations (D’Agostini, pp. 41-68) – and ones which owe it to 
epistemic reasons.  
Considering that no statement is esoteric in itself, but is always in relation to the 
epistemological condition of the subject which is addressed to (Goldman, p. 106), it seems 
appropriate that every novice called to evaluate the experts’ thesis (in our case, judges 
and jurors) can at least ask questions to solve semantic doubts. In regards to procedural 
devices which allow the motion of such questions in the Italian context, this authority is 
undoubtedly recognized to the judge by art. 505, comma 2, c.p.p.18. While in the 
American context, given the aforementioned eminent accusatory nature of this system, 
such authority is not generally expected, but one must underline the constant evolution 
towards such opening, to the point that the states of Arizona, Colorado and Indiana have 
 
17 Wellman already pointed out that few shows, if we want to call them that, can be more absurd and 
incongruous that a jury composed by twelve people who, without any prior study or scientific training, are 
suddenly called to judge controversies where the most distinguished luminaries strongly contradict their 
respective claims (Wellman, p. 171). 
18 «The president [of the panel of judges], even upon request of another member of the college, can ask 
questions to testimonies, experts, technical consultants, people indicated in article 210 and the already 
examined parties, only after examination and cross-examination». 
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already explicitly granted to their jurors the authority to ask the experts questions 
(Montaldo, p. 1). 
The above-mentioned points b) and c), refer more properly to the epistemological 
differences between expert and novice in evaluating the inferential connection between 
premises and conclusion. It results more complex to fill such a void in the short time of 
the trial, because the novice does not have the necessary specialized competence. Thus, 
referring to justifications that each expert offers to support its inferences during a dispute, 
Goldman introduces the distinction between direct and indirect argumentative 
justification (Goldman, pp. 94-96). With the former, the expert E1 aims to offer to the 
novice-listener good reasons that directly support E1’s conclusions. However, 
considering that expert E2 will try to do the same, for the novice it will be very complex 
to understand which of the two justifications has a higher truth-value.  
Hence, the novice will often ‘have to settle’ with relying on indirect argumentative 
justifications, that is to say dialectical superiority of one of the experts, rather than the 
greater smoothness with which one of the experts was able to face the examination and 
cross-examination. It is clear that they are not conclusive factors for evaluating the 
reliability of a thesis but, in any case, can serve as indicators of greater epistemic validity 
of one of the discussed thesis (Goldman, p. 95). In conclusion, we believe that a tool to 
increase reliability of indirect argumentative justification in the legal field, could be to 
make the expert’s examination and cross-examination more complex from a technical-
scientific point of view; for example, allowing experts to examine each other. 
In fact, recalling that both in the Italian and American system this method is precluded, 
we would like to report the critical view offered by Oreste Dominioni:  
 
the need to give effectiveness to the critical examination of the expert’s 
deposition can recommend experts and technical consultants to participate 
actively in the examination with their own questions. It has been said that this 
would exacerbate “the consultant’s position as ‘technical defender’, rather 
than as means of proof” and therefore, should not be allowed. However, it is 
not clear how this effect can be produced: the questions-among-experts 
method projects dialectical research, which is used in the field of study, onto 
the juridical scene, and asking questions to the counter-expert has an internal 




5. Conclusion  
 
 
In the first paragraph, we highlighted how the figure of the judge who faces science 
has changed, in light of the Frye and Daubert rulings. We started from the idea of a 
‘deferent judge’, in front of whom prosecutors and lawyers’ main strategy to challenge 
the expert’s inferences lies in exetastic examinations and use of ad hominem arguments. 
Reaffirmed the actuality of these strategies – in line with Douglas Walton’s studies –, we 
asked ourselves what new prospects for the experts’ cross-examination could there be 
after the ‘Daubert turn’.  
Therefore, stemming from the need that judges and jurors must establish an actual 
dialogue with scientific theories – which are the content of the expert’s testimony – we 
 12 
compared the position of those juridical subjects to a novice who faces a dispute among 
experts and must understand which position has the greatest truth-value. 
By following the five strategies proposed by Alvin Goldman, we asked ourselves 
whether the current procedural devices – both Italian and American – live up to the role 
given to the judge by the Daubert ruling. The answer was not unique. In fact, in some 
cases, we observed an ongoing evolution (such as jurors who ask direct questions to 
experts); while in other cases, we hoped for a legislator’s intervention, for example, 
suggesting the possibility – now, precluded in both legal systems covered in our paper – 
also to involve experts in the reciprocal cross-examination. Embracing the critical 
position of Oreste Dominioni, we underlined how cross-examinations could reach the 
technical-scientific complexity necessary to confer to the indirect argumentative 
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